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 Rebuilding a Nation
 Myths, Realities, and Solutions in Iraq
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 exponential rise in the region's entropy, as US
 policymakers and Iraqis ponder how to deal
 with the violenc  which has engulfed Baghdad.
 Several pernicious myths have entered this debate and, having
 become accepted "facts," cause real-world harm when they
 influence the thinking of foreign policymakers. The myths,
 which assume a lack of national Iraqi identity, artificiality of
 the state, continuous sectarian fighting throughout history,
 Kurdish desire for independence, and Shi'a disloyalty, lead
 some to the conclusion that dividing Iraq is the best way
 to end the violence. Instead of building on these myths,
 however, the international community should create a long-
 term solution by working with the emerging democratic Iraq
 to recognize and develop its historic presence as a unified
 nation. The future of the country is as a cohesive, democratic,
 and pluralistic federation. With that understanding in mind,
 it will be possible to devise a strategy that averts some of
 the darker possible scenarios and helps return Iraq and the
 region to stability.
 The Myth of Artificiality
 The first of these myths is that Iraq is an artificial state,
 created in an exercise of imperial hubris during the waning
 days of the British Empire after World War I. The myth-
 makers, who are universally non-Iraqi, assert that nothing
 historical or cultural binds Iraq's people together. Rather,
 the inhabitants were forced to coexist by their British mas-
 ters, who stitched together the three Ottoman provinces
 of Baghdad, Basra, and Mosul into a single state. This ar-
 gument is not only unhistorical, but it also has a far more
 destructive corollary that there is no point in attempting
 to hold this historic anomaly together and that its natural
 state should be one of division, defacto or de jure, among its
 three components, Shi'a Arab, Sunni Arab, and Kurd. The
 myth ignores that Iraq is actually a nation with an ancient
 identity that actively took part in international affairs and
 modernization before the Saddamist Baathists took control.
 This corollary courts disaster.
 To begin with, Iraq has the oldest recorded history of any
 country on Earth. The word "Iraq" itself is ancient, and prob-
 ably dates back to Akkadian times. When medieval Islamic
 geographers referred to "Iraq," they meant roughly the same
 place we mean now. Over the 500 years it was ruled by the
 Ottomans, the other two provinces were not independent of
 Baghdad, but were administratively subordinate to it. Thus,
 over a span of centuries - if not millennia - the people of Iraq
 have been one, for all their ethnic and confessional differ-
 ences. Ancient history notwithstanding, Iraq has now been
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 a modern state for four score and seven years. Since 1920,
 a distinct Iraqi identity has emerged, one distinct from and
 layered over tribal, ethnic, and sectarian affiliations.
 The process of forging an Iraqi national identity mani-
 fested itself in the country's actions on the international
 stage. Iraq was the first predominately Arab country to gain
 its independence when it was admitted into the League of
 Nations in 1932. It was among the 54 countries that founded
 the United Nations in 1945, and it was also a founder of both
 the League of Arab States and the Organization of Petro-
 leum Exporting Countries. This confidence and vibrancy
 in international affairs mirrored a high degree of internal
 optimism and cohesion.
 Fueled by Iraq's increasing oil wealth, a burst of eco-
 nomic development beginning in the mid-1950s resulted
 in spectacular strides. By the end of 1979 - the last full year
 before the disastrous war with Iran - Iraq was on the verge
 of joining the developed world. Its per capita GDP equaled
 that of Spain, which would enter the European Union six
 years later. By then, Iraq had cash on reserve in hard cur-
 rency reserves totaling US$50 billion (in 1980 terms). It is
 difficult to imagine the heights Iraq might have reached,
 domestically and internationally, had it been blessed with
 more enlightened leadership over the next 23 years. Instead,
 Saddam Hussein launched a series of wars which decimated
 the country's population and economy.
 Colin Powell asserted in 2002 US Congressional tes-
 timony that Iraq was a failed state. That is a hard case to
 prove, given the gains it made from 1920 through 1979. It
 would have been more accurate for Powell to have said that
 after 1979, Iraq had a failed government. Saddam Hussein's
 deliberate policy of maintaining control by playing vio-
 lently on ethnic and confessional differences has led some
 commentators to believe that such differences have always
 resulted in violence in Iraq, even though a long history
 argues otherwise.
 Reconciliation with Insurgent Nationalists
 Despite Saddam Hussein's policies, this national history
 has fostered a true sense of national Iraqi identity that can-
 not be lightly dismissed. Indeed, as UN officials continually
 assert, it has been clear for some time that a significant seg-
 ment - it is difficult to quantify the percentage precisely - of
 the current insurgency is now composed of Iraqi nationalists
 fighting against what they perceive as a potential break-up
 of the country by outside forces. These nationalists are in-
 dividuals who, though suspicious of the United States, were
 relieved by the removal of the previous regime. Decisions
 made along the way, such as the dissolution of the army
 and overly aggressive de-Baathification, have pushed these
 individuals and groups to violence.
 The United Nations is a logical intermediary in the
 efforts of the Iraqi government to reach out and provide
 both nonviolent avenues for discussion and reassurance that
 the dissolution of Iraq is not on the agenda. Another way of
 reaching out to Iraqi nationalists involves the constitutional
 process, a method which is often largely ignored by the
 international community. In October 2005, an agreement
 was brokered immediately prior to the referendum on the
 permanent constitution, which had garnered opposition and
 rejection by both nationalist and Sunni parties. Under the
 agreement's terms, the process of amending the constitution
 would be re-opened during the first session of parliament.
 This pact was appropriate, recalling that, because the Sunni
 parties had boycotted the elections for the constitution-draft-
 ing Assembly, they then had minimal representation in the
 drafting process. In essence, the agreement extended the
 transitional period long enough to allow for full Sunni par-
 ticipation, even though the referendum has already approved
 Opposite: Iraqi police forces in Najaf celebrate the successful
 constitutional referendum. Above: An Iraqi boy burns a bank
 note featuring former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein.
 the permanent constitution. As things turned out, a swing of
 73,000 votes in Nineveh Governorate, just two-thirds of one
 percent of the total vote, would have defeated the constitu-
 tion. Had this last-minute agreement not occurred, it is likely
 that the constitution would have been defeated.
 Proceeding with the constitutional amendment pro-
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 cess would not only honor a promise, but would also allow
 for addressing substantive deficits in the document. One
 gaping lacuna in the permanent constitution relates to the
 ambiguities respecting the ownership, management, and
 distribution of Iraq's oil. This issue is perceived by many
 insurgent nationalists as fundamental to the future unity and
 stability of the country, and thus the ambiguities constitute
 a major irritant.
 Regardless of any eventual substantive resolution,
 however, re-opening the amendment process allows for full
 acceptance of the process of constitution-drafting, which,
 by virtue of the Sunni parties' boycott, did not occur in
 2005. Though there is broad agreement within Iraq's polity
 that the future of the country is as a unified, democratic,
 and pluralistic federation, there is not yet a consensus as to
 what federalism means in the Iraqi context. Engaging in the
 review process would allow for discussion by all parliamen-
 tary parties on these and other issues, thereby increasing
 confidence-building measures among not only the parties,
 but their respective constituents as well.
 Any political solution would, of course, include a rec-
 onciliation process. Here the Iraqis must have a free hand
 to deal with their compatriots, which they have not had in
 the recent past. In 2004, when then-Prime Minister Iyad
 Allawi announced amnesty for those outside the political
 process, the US embassy in Baghdad immediately declared
 that such a policy would not be available to anyone who had
 spilt American blood. This statement, in turn, led Prime
 Minister Allawi to say that amnesty would not apply to those
 who had killed Iraqis.
 While current Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki was
 c ntemp ating another such amnesty in May 2006, the US
C ngress decried amnesty for those who had killed US
citizen . Yet if amnesty was not for those who had been
 involved in insurgent acts, for whose benefit was it? For
 reconciliation to have meaning, it has to include some un-
 savo y characters, including some who have shed the blood
 of Iraqis a d US citizens. That, after all, is the experience of
 other countries in similar circumstances. The Germans, for
 instance, had to reverse an overly rigorous de-Nazification
proces in order to maintain national cohesion and rebuild
 a functioning state.
 There are other avenues of cooperation with insurgent
 ationalists. These nationalists are unlikely to be sanguine
 at the targe ing of large numbers of Iraqi civilians by Al
 Qaeda and the Saddamist Baathists; they may even join
 i  the fi ht against such organizations if they are induced
to join the political process. Thus, political dialogue with
 insurgent natio alists and their inclusion in a reconcilia-
 tion process that aims toward a unified Iraq will have the
 additional and necessary benefit of isolating both AI Qaeda
 and the Saddamists.
 Neith r AI Qaeda nor the Saddamists have a negotiable
 political agenda. They possess instead a nihilistic desire to
 destroy he political process which has been under way for
 the past three ye rs. AI Qaeda and its allies in Iraq endeavor
 to establish a Taliban-style Islamic emirate and to defeat the
 United States and its allies not only in Iraq, but throughout
 the worl . The Saddamists wish to return Iraq to the era
 of absolute rule by the Baath Party. Like AI Qaeda, they
 therefore thoroughly reject the political process. Neither
 group is interested in political dialogue, much less compro-
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 mise. These two groups can only be dealt with militarily, a
 process which would be greatly facilitated through isolating
 them from the nationalists by reassuring the latter of Iraq's
 continued unity as a federated state and engaging them in
 the reconciliation and political processes.
 Confronting Death Squads , Not Civilian Hatred
 An oft-repeated myth was recendy articulated on CNN's
 "Late Edition" by US Senator Gordon Smith. Smith, re-
 assuring the viewer that he was an avid student of history,
 informed Wolf Blitzer that the Shi'as and Sunnis of Iraq have
 been "butchering each other for four times longer than we
 have been a nation." There have been, unfortunately, too
 many instances in Iraq's past when the central government
 in Baghdad has targeted one or another group for violence:
 the Assyrians in 1933, the Kurds in 1987 and 1988, and the
 Marsh Arabs in 1991. Yet, with the possible exception of
 the mistreatment of Baghdad's Jews in 1941, there has not
 been a single instance of civilian, neighbor-versus-neighbor,
 ethno-confessional violence in Iraq's modern history. For
 example, there is no instance of the Kurds of a village rising
 to massacre the Arabs, or vice versa.
 Even now, the overwhelming majority of Baghdad's
 population is caught in the midst of violence, yet desires
 nothing more than peace and the opportunity to rebuild the
 country. Death squads drive this violence, which represents
 the first sectarian violence in Iraqi history. Though much has
 happened since then, an illustration from 2003 demonstrates
 where the hearts of Baghdadis lie: as the previous regime
 collapsed, a mob of ruffians approached the neighborhood
 in which Baghdad's last remaining Jewish families lived.
 Realizing what was likely about to happen, the neighbor-
 hood's Muslim residents formed a cordon, challenging the
 approaching mob and successfully protecting their Jewish
 neighbors. The long history of amity among Iraq's people
 augurs well for their ability to overcome current sectarian
 tensions.
 Not even this sectarian violence, occurring principally
 in Baghdad, is neighbor-versus-neighbor. Rather, it is largely
 the result of a deliberate policy by AI Qaeda to ignite a civil
 war. It is also the work of organized death squads, some of
 which have leaderships with one foot in the government
 and one outside. These death squads are not fighting each
 other, with the exception of negligible skirmishes. Instead,
 they are targeting civilians.
 The most immediate threat confronting Iraqis is the
 existence of these death squads that roam, with substantial
 impunity, throughout the capital. As in other contexts in
 the Middle East, a small minority of extremists, despite a
 dearth of popular support, are nonetheless able to subject
 the majority to its will. Baghdad's beleaguered population
 has suffered unspeakable horrors. Because the government
 has not yet demonstrated the ability to protect the popula-
 tion, Baghdadis are understandably tempted to hide behind
 militias that do offer some form of protection. But to date,
 despite that temptation, these sectarian death squads have not
 demonstrated the ability to actually rally Baghdad's civilian
 populations to their sides.
 Disarming these death squads and promoting the capac-
 ity of the government to protect its citizens will restore the
 trans-confessional harmony which has been the natural state
 of Iraq throughout its history. The government of Iraq has
 announced its commitment to accomplishing this goal. To
 that end, the planned surge of Multinational Forces (MNF)
 in Baghdad is a salutary development, as, of course, is the
 planned concomitant acceleration of the training of Iraq's
 own security forces. The goal must not be merely to enhance
 the role of the MNF. In the long term, Iraqi forces must be
 sufficiently trained, strengthened, and equipped to be able to
 provide security on their own. In addition to further training
 and better equipment, these forces must be purged of the
 unofficial militia elements which have infiltrated them. This
 process has also begun thorough screening and re-training of
 specific units. As militias are disarmed, Iraq's nascent security
 forces will have to earn the trust of Baghdad's population,
 street by street and neighborhood by neighborhood.
 The Myth of Kurdish Separatism
 Another perpetuated myth is that the Kurds of Iraq seek
 independence. The Kurdish leadership certainly understands
 that the Kurds will have much greater stability within a
 united Iraq rather than as part of a fragmented country. The
 leadership understands that it may now occupy the ideal posi-
 tion: autonomy in northern Iraq with a hand on the levers
 of power in Baghdad, all protected by an internationally
 recognized border. Nor is this concept of autonomy new to
 Iraqi politics: the term autonomy in the context of Kurdistan
 has been in the Iraqi lexicon since the 1960s, when it was first
 promised. The difference now is that the promise to Iraq's
 Kurds is not purely rhetorical. Their rights are no longer
 "THE LONG HISTORY OF AMITY AMONG
 IRAQ'S PEOPLE AUGURS WELL
 FORTHEIR ABILITY TO OVERCOME
 CURRENT SECTARIAN TENSIONS."
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 merely enshrined on paper, but are being respected on the
 ground. It is no small occurrence that Masoud Barazani,
 president of the Kurdistan Regionàl Government, stated in
 the ceremony announcing the interim constitution that, for
 the first time in his life, he was proud to be an Iraqi. Kurdish
 linguistic and political rights, which were already protected
 in the interim constitution, were preserved and augmented
 in the permanent constitution.
 Given the barbarous treatment of ethnic Kurds through-
 out the 3 5 -year Baathist reign of horror, including nearly 1 5
 years of separation enforced by US and Allied jets, it is not
 surprising that many rank-and-file Iraqi Kurds are indeed
 skeptical of Iraq as a state. It may take time, but after the
 process of political, economic, and social re-integration has
 taken its course, it is easily predictable that the ardor for
 independence that they possess will cool. There is reason to
 believe that this process has already begun, as demonstrated
 by the overwhelming support in Iraqi Kurdistan regarding
 the referendum for a permanent constitution - a document
 that preserves Kurdish rights within a united, federated Iraq.
 Moreover, it should not be assumed in the first place that all
 Kurdish rank-and-file desire separation. The results of both
 the January and December 2005 elections suggest there is
 little appetite for secession amongst the Kurds of Baghdad,
 the city with the single largest Kurdish
 population in the country.
 The Myth ofShVa Disloyalty
 The last myth informing much
 of the debate in Western and other
 capitals is that Iraq's Shi'a population
 anxiously awaits the first opportu-
 nity to unite with Iran. Among others,
 Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak
 has publicly voiced such views. Inher-
 ent in the myth is that Iraq's Shi'a
 population is of Iranian descent, even
 though the vast majority of Iraq's Shi'a
 are descended from Arab tribes who
 converted to Shi'ism in the last two
 hundred years or so.
 But there could be no more de-
 finitive repudiation of this myth than
 the eight years of brutal fighting in
 the Iran-Iraq war. A quarter-million
 Iraqis died in that conflict. Since the
 Iraqi conscript army was composed
 predominately of Shi'as, the Shi'a
 population took the brunt of the ca-
 sualties. Iraq's Shi'as fought and died
 for Iraq, in contrast to 1991 and 2003,
 when the army refused to fight for
 Saddam against the United States and
 its allies. The identification of the Shi'a
 conscripts, first and foremost, was with their country. Just
 as Iraq's Shi'a population thought of itself as Iraqi, Iran's
 ethnic Arab population in Khuzistan province regarded
 itself as Iranian, fighting the Iraqi army with ferocity. This
 otherwise pointless war proved one thing: the Middle East's
 post- World War I state system was ingrained in the minds
 of the peoples of the region, and those who would tamper
 with it do so at their own peril.
 The Implications of a Divided Iraq
 Notwithstanding the lesson so brutally learned in the
 Iran-Iraq war and the many other realities on the ground,
 there are those - principally US citizens and elected of-
 ficials - who advocate Iraq's division. They harken back
 nearly a century to the myth of colonial creation. Indeed,
 they are themselves prepared to commit the same sin which
 they accuse the British of having committed: engaging in a
 neo-colonialist impulse to dispose of what is not theirs and
 tampering with what have been stable international bor-
 ders-despite Saddam's repeated attempts to ram them - for
 nearly a century. This is a Sykes-Picot Agreement for the new
 century. Whatever else is happening there today, no Iraqi is
 fighting to secure the division of the country.
 Some go further, advocating the stationing of US troops
 Kurdish women carry posters in support of Iraqi President JalalTalabani in Sulaima-
 nia, northeast of Baghdad.After spending two weeks in a Jordanian hospital, Talabani
 returned to Iraq to the cheers of thousands of Kurds.The question of a permanent
 Iraqi constitution has been met with great support in Iraqi Kurdistan.
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 in Iraqi Kurdistan to effectuate the division. They fail, how-
 ever, to consider the effect of doing so: the United States
 would be rightly seen throughout the region and the larger
 Islamic world as having forcibly divided Iraq at the point of
 a gun - in effect "proving" that such division was the real
 goal of the intervention from the beginning.
 It is hard to overstate the negative effect this perception
 would have on US standing throughout the Islamic world in
 the long term, as it would immeasurably bolster recruitment
 into the ranks of militant Islam. In that sense, former US Am-
 bassador John Bolton's recent assertion that Iraq's territorial
 integrity is not part of US "strategic interest" is myopic.
 Advocates of division also fail to fully comprehend
 implications within the region. An independent Kurdistan,
 even if it were independent in all but name, would be viewed
 as an existential threat in three capitals: Damascus, Ankara,
 and Tehran. Each of those capitals' countries has a larger
 Kurdish population than does Iraq. As such, they would have
 a vested interest in creating instability for this landlocked
 mini-entity, fearing, as each does, Kurdish separatism within
 their own states.
 Furthermore, division would not result in three neat
 entities. The southern region could easily fracture into two
 to four zones, each ruled by its own warlord. This scenario
 would have worse implications for the large Shi'a popula-
 tions in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the other Gulf States.
 West-central Iraq, in the meantime, would likely fracture
 into at least two zones of its own, one ruled by former regime
 loyalists, the other becoming a Taliban-style emirate on the
 border with Jordan. All this says nothing of the devastating
 human tragedy that would unfold with massive population
 shifts, as Iraq's highly integrated populations move into dif-
 fering ethno-sectarian zones.
 Nor should the centripetal effect of a unified Iraq be
 lightly dismissed where the Kurds are concerned. They
 were unable to form a cohesive government during their 12
 years of enforced separation from Baghdad until Iraq was put
 back together in 2005, and they fought a bloody civil war
 among themselves in the process. In short, ripping apart a
 country in the heart of the Arab and Islamic worlds would
 result in a degree of regional instability that would make
 the last 60 years of Middle East history look like peace and
 tranquility itself.
 Iraq's neighbors understand the catastrophic implica-
 tions of this scenario. While some of them have contributed
 to what they had hoped would be limited chaos they could
 control, the threatened disintegration of Iraq is not in their
 collective or individual self-interests, unleashing, as it will,
 competitive forces between them that will be impossible to
 control. It has thus become clear that a political solution to
 Iraq's problems must include dialogue with each of its six
 contiguous neighbors, as well as with other powers. Such
 dialogue would serve to reassure countries that a stable,
 democratic Iraq will pose no threat to their interests. Iraq's
 neighbors must, in turn, abide by their obligations under the
 2005 UN Security Council Resolution 1618, which called
 upon regional countries to refrain from providing assistance
 of any type to those individuals or organizations who are
 committing acts of violence in Iraq. Iraq's continued engage-
 ment with regional powers will help engender stability in
 Iraq and the larger region.
 Supporting Reconciliation and Stability
 Undertaking concrete steps in conjunction with various
 parties is the only hope of creating an internal and regional
 environment capable of bringing about a solution to the
 violence which now grips Iraq. Recalling the country's own
 history of inter-communal harmony and cohesion, the steps
 must begin by expanding the political process, reopening
 constitutional negotiations on critical issues, and starting a
 serious reconciliation process, thereby isolating AI Qaeda
 and the Saddamists. The political process in Iraq must ad-
 ditionally engage Iraq's neighbors. In the meantime, the
 temporary surge of US troops must go toward disarming
 militias in Baghdad. Ultimately, any approach to Iraq's
 problems must not be merely a short-sighted expediency,
 but one which takes into account a strategic vision for the
 region, one that promotes stability and isolates radicalism,
 with the goal of definitively defeating it.
 In the end, Iraqis will have to solve for themselves the
 difficult political questions and make the complex compro-
 mises necessary to stabilize their own country. This process
 of statecraft is not a matter of genetic memory, but rather
 a learnt behavior - one whose lessons, after 35 years of
 absolute tyranny, Iraq's political elite are learning under far
 less than ideal circumstances. The international community
 can help Iraqis reach, if not a consensus, at least a modus
 vivendi , by acting as a catalyst, promoting the process of
 political reconciliation and generating regional support for
 the stability and unity of Iraq. GO
 "RIPPING APART A COUNTRY IN THE HEART OF
 THE ARAB AND ISLAMIC WORLDS...WOULD MAKE
 THE LAST 60 YEARS OF MIDDLE EAST HISTORY
 LOOK LIKE PEACE AND TRANQUILITY ITSELF."
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